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may be considered only for the limited purpose of remedying defects
in the complaint. The Survey also discusses In re Agioritis, wherein
the Court held that a change in either the depository bank or the
beneficiary of a Totten trust is sufficient to create a "new deposit,"
and hence, a testamentary substitute subject to the surviving
spouse's right of election. Consideration is also given to the Court
of Appeals' reaffirmation in People v. Cassidy of the "merger doctrine" with respect to prosecutions for kidnapping in the second
degree.
As in the past, this issue of The Survey also discusses several
significant decisions of the lower New York courts. With our discussion of these cases, it is hoped that The Survey will keep the practitioner abreast of significant developments in New York practice.
ARTICLE 2-LIMITATIONS OF TIME

CPLR 203(c): Revival of landlord's time-barred counterclaim for
reformation of lease denied in action by tenant for recovery of rent
overpayment.
CPLR 203(c) codifies the doctrine of equitable recoupment,
permitting the assertion of a defense or counterclaim which arose
from the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences as a claim asserted in a complaint, even if the defense
or counterclaim was time-barred at the commencement of the action.' Despite a commentator's suggestion that the "same transaction or occurrence" proviso be broadly construed,2 recently, the
Court of Appeals, in SCM Corp. v. FisherPark Lane Co.,3 held that
a landlord's counterclaim for reformation of the lease agreement,
CPLR 203(c) provides in pertinent part:
A defense or counterclaim is not barred if it was not barred at the time the claims
asserted in the complaint were interposed, except that if the defense or counterclaim arose from the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, upon which a claim asserted in the complaint depends, it is not barred to
the extent of the demand in the complaint notwithstanding that it was barred at
the time the claims asserted in the complaint were interposed.
The doctrine of equitable recoupment operates not as a basis for "affirmative relief
against [the] plaintiff, by way of counterclaim, for any balance proven in . . . [the] defendant's favor," but rather serves "only . . . to abate, in whole or in part, [the] plaintiff's
demand." Title Guar. & Trust Co. v. Hicks, 283 App. Div. 723, 724, 127 N.Y.S.2d 340, 342
(2d Dep't 1954) (mem.); see Maders v. Lawrence, 49 Hun 360, 2 N.Y.S. 159 (3d Dep't 1888);

Herbert v. Day, 33 Hun 461, 15 Abb. N. Cas. 172 (N.Y. 1st Dep't 1884); First Nat'l City Bank
v. Drake, 170 N.Y.L.J. 62, Sept. 27, 1973, at 17, col. 6 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County).
See 1 WK&M 203.25, at 2-86.
40 N.Y.2d 788, 358 N.E.2d 1024, 390 N.Y.S.2d 398, aff'g 53 App. Div 2d 595, 385
N.Y.S.2d 79 (1st Dep't 1976) (mer.).
2
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asserted in an action by the tenant for recovery of overpayment of
rent, did not arise "from the transactions, occurrences, or series of
transactions or occurrences" upon which the tenant's claim for overpayment depended.
The parties in SCM entered into an agreement in 1966 in which
the tenant leased several floors of a commercial building for a 50year term. The lease provided for a fixed rental, subject to certain
annual adjustments. The agreement further provided that the parties would submit to arbitration any disputes arising from the adjustment provision of the lease.4 After entering the premises, the
tenant received notice each year of a rent escalation due to an increase in either taxes or operating expenses. These payments were
made without objection until the latter part of 1973.1 On February
15, 1974, the tenant served a demand for arbitration, claiming that
the landlord's calculation of the yearly adjustments had been improper. In his amended answer, the landlord sought to have the
lease rewritten by the arbitrators so as to raise the annual rent
adjustments.' The tenant then instituted the present proceeding,
seeking to stay arbitration of the claim for reformation. The application for the stay was based on CPLR 7502(b), which authorizes a
stay of arbitration if "the claim sought to be arbitrated would have
been barred by limitation of time had it been asserted in a court
"7The tenant asserted that the reformation was barred by the
40 N.Y.2d at 789, 358 N.E.2d at 1026, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
The lease commenced on February 28, 1968. Id. Thereafter, on August 6, 1969, the
tenant was apprised of a rent escalation resulting from an increase in taxes for the 1969-1970
tax year. Another increase, due to a rise in operating expenses during the 1969 fiscal year,
was imposed on September 11, 1970. Further increments, imposed in subsequent years as a
consequence of increases in taxes and operating expenses, were paid by the tenant until the
1972 expense increases and 1972-1974 tax increases became due.
I Id. at 790, 358 N.E.2d at 1026, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 400-01. The claim for reformation was
predicated upon mutual mistake. The landlord maintained that the parties had intended that
the tenant would pay for the building's electrical expenses which were attributable to the
tenant's own consumption. Brief for Respondent-Appellant at 8-9, SCM Corp. v. Fisher Park
Lane Co., 40 N.Y.2d 788, 358 N.E.2d 1024, 390 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1976). In his answer, the
landlord designated this claim for reformation as a "Fifth Defense." Id. As Judge Jones noted,
however, this characterization was improper:
What the landlord asserts in this present instance is not a defense - that is, a bar
to the claim asserted by the tenant - but is in the nature of a counterclaim, i.e., a
statement of circumstances which in and of themselves may form the basis of an

adjudication of affirmative relief in favor of the landlord on its claim, irrespective
of the tenant's success or failure on the latter's cause of action.
40 N.Y.2d at 791, 358 N.E.2d at 1027, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 401. See generally President &
Directors of the Manhatten Co. v. Cocheo, 256 App. Div. 560, 10 N.Y.S.2d 770 (2d Dep't
1939).

7 CPLR 7502(b). Pursuant to CPLR 7503(b) a party may make an application to stay
arbitration on the ground that the claim sought to be arbitrated is barred by 7502(b).
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applicable 6-year statute of limitations since the claim was not asserted until nearly 10 years after execution of the lease.8 The landlord contended, however, that section 203(c) enabled it to assert the
otherwise time-barred claim for reformation to the extent of the
tenant's demand for recovery of its alleged overpayment.
Rejecting the landlord's contention, Judge Jones, writing for a
divided Court of Appeals, held that the claim for reformation was
time-barred. The SCM Court reasoned that the tenant's claim of
alleged rent overpayment was predicated on the landlord's acts of
computing and assessing the escalations subsequent to the execution of the lease, whereas the landlord's claim for reformation was
based upon the intention of the parties prior to and at the moment
of execution of the lease agreement itself.'0 Hence, Judge Jones
found that the landlord's counterclaim did not satisfy the 203(c)
requirement that it arise from the same "transactions, occurrences,
or series of transactions or occurrences" upon which the tenant's
claim depended. Since the landlord would have been time-barred
from asserting the claim for reformation of the 1966 agreement in a
law action in 1974, and, because the action was not revived pursuant
to CPLR 203(c), the majority concluded that arbitration of the landlord's claim had been properly stayed."
Judge Cooke, in a dissenting opinion in which Judge Gabrielli
concurred, characterized the majority's application of the same
"transaction or occurrence" test as "too narrow" and argued that
the language of the statute should be construed in a more liberal
fashion.' 2 Declaring that both claims arose from the same transac40 N.Y.2d at 790, 358 N.E.2d at 1026, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 401. If the landlord was to seek
reformation of the lease agreement in a judicial proceeding, the action would be barred by
the residuary 6-year limitation prescribed by CPLR 213(1). Relying upon Bartlett v. Judd,
21 N.Y. 199 (1860), the landlord argued that an equitable defense such as reformation is never
barred by a statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals summarily disposed of this contention, however, finding that the landlord's assertion was a counterclaim rather than a defense.
40 N.Y.2d at 791, 358 N.E.2d at 1027, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
1 40 N.Y.2d at 789, 358 N.E.2d at 1026, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 400. Judge Fuchsberg, in a
separate opinion, concurred in the result, but disagreed with the majority's indication that
reformation is an arbitral issue. See note 12 infra. Judge Cooke, joined by Judge Gabrielli,
dissented and voted to reverse on the ground that the statute of limitations should not be
held to bar the landlord's counterclaim. 40 N.Y.2d at 795, 358 N.E.2d at 1030, 390 N.Y.S.2d
at 404 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
ID Id. at 791, 358 N.E.2d at 1027, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
" 40 N.Y.2d at 791-92, 358 N.E.2d at 1027, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 402. As succinctly stated
by Judge Jones, "[t]he tenant's claim relates to performance under the contract; the landlord's relates to the negotiation and articulation of the agreement made between the parties
prior to its execution." Id. at 792, 358 N.E.2d at 1027, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
2 Id. at 792, 358 N.E.2d at 1030, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 405. The Court also expressed the view
that arbitrators have the power under a broad arbitration clause to grant relief in the nature
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tion, viz, the negotiation of the terms of the lease and the intention
of the parties at the time of its negotiation, the dissenters posited
that the landlord's claim was actually one for equitable recoupment
which, if valid, should be allowed to the extent of the tenant's claim
in the arbitration proceeding. 3
It is submitted that the Court's application of the same
"transaction or occurrence" test to the facts in SCM accurately
implements the language of CPLR 203(c). While "in a most general
sense both [claims] might be said to be associated with the
lease,"'" closer scrutiny of the underlying facts reveals that the landlord's claim presents issues distinctly different from those raised by
the tenant's complaint. 5 Thus, it is suggested that the Court was
reasonable in finding that the transactional requirement was not
satisfied. 6 The dissent's warning against an overly restrictive conof reformation by rewriting provisions of the lease. Id. at 789, 358 N.E.2d at 1026, 390
N.Y.S.2d at 400 (dictum). In considering this issue, the Court took note of the arbitration
clause that the parties had included in the lease which provided that "[i]f there be any
dispute between Landlord [Fisher] and Tenant [SCM] with respect to the provisions...
[concerning yearly increases,] the issue shall be expeditiously submitted to the American
" Brief for Respondent-Appellant at 4-5,
Arbitration Assocation for determination ....
SCM Corp. v. Fisher Park Lane Co., 40 N.Y.2d 788,358 N.E.2d 1024,390 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1976)
(emphasis in original). In turn, the rules of the American Arbitration Association expressly
authorize an arbitrator to "grant any remedy or relief which he deems just and equitable
.
. " AM. ARB. Ass'N Comm.R. 42 (1977). Reasoning that the landlord's claim for reformation falls clearly within the scope of the parties' agreement to arbitrate "any dispute" relating
to the rent escalation provision of the lease and, further, that it is the function of arbitrators
to "fashion the remedy appropriate to the wrong," Paver & Wildfoerster v. Catholic High
School Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 669, 677, 345 N.E.2d 565, 569, 382 N.Y.S.2d 22, 26 (1976), the
majority concluded that an arbitrator could grant the remedy of reformation. Judge Fuchsberg, while concurring in the majority's decision to stay arbitration, stated that since the
parties had not expressly conferred upon the arbitrators the authority to rewrite the contract,
reformatory relief was outside the scope of the arbitrators' power. 40 N.Y.2d at 794-95, 358
N.E.2d at 1029-30, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 403-04 (Fuchsberg, J., concurring).
13 40 N.Y.2d at 796, 358 N.E.2d at 1030, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 405 (Cooke, J., dissenting). With
respect to the statement of the majority that the tenant's claim relates to "performance under
the contract," while the landlord's claim relates to "negotiation and articulation. . . prior
to its execution," the dissent countered that "[i]t is precisely this type of conceptualism that
CPLR 203 (subd. [c]) was intended to eliminate." Id. Some authorities indicate, however,
that the statute was intended to eliminate the inequities resulting from judicial reluctance
to permit interposition of a tort claim as a recoupment against a contract claim under the
CPA. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Atlas Oil Co., 28 App. Div. 2d 644, 280 N.Y.S.2d 731 (4th Dep't
1967) (mem.); CPLR 203, commentary at 119 (McKinney 1972); 1 WK&M %203.25.
1140 N.Y.2d at 796, 358 N.E.2d at 1030, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 405 (Cooke, J., dissenting). In
support of his contention that the landlord's counterclaim arose from the same series of
transactions or occurrences as the tenant's claim, Judge Cooke offered the following view of
the facts: "The tenant's claims relate to whether the landlord computed additional rent in
accordance with the lease; the landlord's counterclaim relates to the question of what were
the correct percentages to be used in computing such rent." Id.
" Id. at 792, 358 N.E.2d at 1027, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
" CPLR 203(e), which permits a claim in an amended pleading to relate back to the date
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struction of CPLR 203(c) should not, however, go unheeded; nor, it
is submitted, should the majority's approach be interpreted as indicative of a judicial narrowing of the equitable recoupment doctrine. The significance of the SCM decision lies in the method of
analysis utilized by the Court in determining the applicability of
section 203(c): careful scrutiny of all facets of the claims, defenses,
and counterclaims asserted by the opposing litigants.
ARTICLE 3-JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE OF
COURT

CPLR 301: Application of the "doing business"predicateto acquire
in personam jurisdictionover nonresident individuals.
CPLR 301 preserves the predicates for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction that were recognized under pre-CPLR law." One
such predicate, the "doing business" test, permits the exercise of
jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries engaged in a continuous and systematic course of business within the state in actions not associated
with that party's New York operations.' 8 Previously, this jurisdictional predicate had been applied only to foreign corporations.' 9
of the original pleading, also contains the "transaction or occurrence" language found in §
203(c). See 1 WK&M 203.25, at 2-86. In determining the applicability of 203(e), courts
appear to focus on the facts underlying the claims rather than the legal theories upon which
the causes of action are founded. See, e.g., Town Bd. v. National Sur. Corp., 53 Misc. 2d 23,
277 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1967), aff'd mem., 29 App. Div. 2d 726, 286
N.Y.S.2d 122 (3d Dep't 1968). The SCM Court, in reasoning that the facts underlying the
landlord's claim related to mutual mistake while the facts inherent in the tenant's claim
pertained to improper mathematical assessments, see text accompanying note 10 supra,
seemingly employed an "emphasis of the facts" mode of analysis similar to the test employed
under § 203(e).
,1 CPLR 301 provides: "A court may exercise such jurisdiction over persons, property,
or status as might have been exercised heretofore."
11See The Biannual Survey, 39 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 406, 413 (1965). The doing business
predicate evolved out of decisional law. It first surfaced in New York in Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917) (Cardozo, J.), wherein the Court held that
a corporation which does business in New York "with a fair measure of permanence and
continuity . . . is within the jurisdiction of our courts" regardless of the origin of the cause
of action. Id. at 267, 115 N.E. at 917. See generally Prashker, Service of Summons on NonResident Natural Persons Doing Business in New York, 15 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 1, 18-19
(1940)[hereinafter cited as Prashkerl.
" See, e.g., Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 339 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1964); Bryant v.
Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965); Curran v.
Rouse Transp. Corp., 42 Misc. 2d 1055, 249 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1964). In
Curran the court refused to extend the doing business test to nonresident individuals. Id. at
1058, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 721. A federal tribunal, however, in Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 349 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), applied the test to a partnership without
discussing the fact that it previously had been applied only to corporations. Id. at 712-15.

